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NOTE 
TURNER V. ANHEUSER-BuSCH, INC.: CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT PROVIDES EMPLOYERS WITH A 
MORE FAVORABLE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
STANDARD 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc./ the California Su-
preme Court held that James Turner's claim for constructive 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy failed as a mat-
ter of law.2 The court held Turner could not show either objec-
tively intolerable aggravated conditions on the job or that his 
employer violated public policy.3 Because Turner did not state 
a cognizable claim, the court reinstated the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment in favor of Turner's employer Anheuser-
Busch, Incorporated (hereinafter "ABI,,).4 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court significantly modified the constructive dis-
charge test by no longer allowing a plaintiff to use the 
employer's constructive knowledge of intolerable or aggravated 
working conditions as an element of a constructive discharge 
claim.5 The court held that Turner could not prove a public 
policy violation in part because a significant amount of time 
1. Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). (per Lucas, 
C.J.; Arabian, Baxter, George, J.J., concurring; Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting; 
Kennard J. dissenting, joined by Woods, J. (Presiding Justice of the Court of Ap-
peal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Acting Chairperson 
of the Judicial Council). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 1035. 
5. Id. at 1029. 
675 
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had passed between Turner's whistle-blowing activities and his 
eventual resignation.6 Moreover, the majority found Turner's 
claim that his supervisors had used fabricated performance 
appraisals to force his resignation untenable primarily because 
the appraisals appeared valid on their face. 7 Consequently, an 
employer may avoid a constructive discharge claim simply by 
either waiting some time before engaging in conduct designed 
to force an employer to resign, or by ensuring that any adverse 
treatment of employees is supported by negative performance 
appraisals.8 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On January 3, 1989, James M. Turner tendered his resig-
nation from ABI where he had worked in various capacities for 
approximately eleven years.9 Until his voluntary resignation 
in 1981, Turner had worked as an industrial relations manager 
at ABI's Los Angeles brewery for approximately six years. 10 In 
January of 1984, Turner returned to ABI's wholesale opera-
tions division as ''branch off-premises coordinator" in the sales 
department. 11 
While there, Turner complained about illegal conduct al-
legedly perpetrated by his supervisor William Schmitt. 12 
Turner claimed that Schmitt had violated alcoholic beverage 
laws by giving gifts to liquor retailers13 and by encouraging 
6. [d. at 1032-34. 
7. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032 
8. See infra Section VI. 
9. Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Cal. 1994). 
10. [d. at 1024. 
11. [d. The branch off-premises sales coordinator was responsible for coordinat-
ing sales activities with retailers who sold ABI products for consumption away 
from the retailer's premises. [d. Turner's immediate supervisor was William 
Schmitt. [d. Schmitt's supervisor was George Liakos. [d. 
12. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
13. [d. Turner alleged that Schmitt gave liquor retailers Anheuser-Busch jack-
ets and baseball tickets. [d. 
Under the California Alcoholic Beverages Control Act, alcoholic beverage 
wholesalers may not "[f]urnish, give or lend any money or other thing of val-
ue . . . to . . . any person engaged in operating, owning or maintaining any off-
sale licensed premises." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 25502 (a)(2) (West 1985 & 
Supp.). Alcoholic beverage manufacturers may not "[g]ive or furnish, directly or 
indirectly, to any employee of any holder of a retail on-sale or ofT-sale license only 
2
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ABI employees to remove advertisements posted by ABl's com-
petitors. 14 
In December 1984,15 Schmitt gave Turner an overall rat-
ing of "needs improvement" on his annual performance ap-
praisal. 16 The appraisal stated that Turner failed to timely 
and accurately complete important sales reports and to follow 
through on sales and marketing projects. 17 Schmitt's supervi-
sor George Liakos contended that the appraisal was based 
solely on an objective review of Turner's performance during 
anything of value for the purpose or with the intent to solicit, acquire, or obtain 
the help or assistance of the employee to encourage or promote either the pur-
chase or the sale of the alcoholic beverage sold or manufactured by the licensee 
giving or furnishing anything of value, and any employee who accepts or acquires 
anything of value contrary to the provisions of this subdivision is guilty of a mis-
demeanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25503(d) (West 1985). 
Turner claimed that Liakos directed Schmitt to "have the customers make 
payments for the material which was given in violation of the Alcohol and Bever-
age Commission regulations." Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
In his declaration, Liakos claimed he terminated the investigation when Schmitt 
told him that customer had paid for the jacket. [d. at nA. Turner also claimed 
to have complained when he received information that Schmitt had directed a 
subordinate to give professional baseball tickets to another ABI customer. [d. at 
1039. Turner stated that he passed this information along to Bill Richards, the 
operations manager for the wholesale operations division. [d. 
14. [d. at 1039-40. The court noted that interfering with product display and 
advertising of competing sellers inside retail outlets might be construed as illegal 
"ribbonizing." [d. at 1034 n.12. While the court criticized Turner for failing to 
identify the proper statutory basis for his claim, the majority opinion itself cited 
inapplicable sections of the California Business and Professions Code for the propo-
sition that ribbonizing is illegal; i.e., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25502(b) (regulat-
ing the transfer of beer and wine wholesale licenses acquired before 1947) and 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25503.3 (allowing alcoholic beverage manufacturers to 
advertise in trade publications and to serve samples at trade shows). In fact, it is 
California Business and Professions Code § 25503.2(d) which prohibits so-called 
"ribbonizing." Section 25503.2(d) provides that alcoholic beverage wholesalers may 
rotate and manipulate only their own displays and products on the retailer's pre-
mises. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25503.2(d). See Markstein Distributing Co. v. 
Rice, 135 Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding that liquor wholesaler's 
tampering with the products of another manufacturer is illegal ribbonizing). 
15. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting). This was Turner's 
second performance appraisal since returning to ABI in January of 1984. [d. In 
his first performance appraisal in June 1984, Turner received an overall rating of 
"good," which the appraisal form defmes as "consistently dependable and compe-
tent performance of the job." [d. 
16. [d. The appraisal form defines the "needs improvement" rating as "perfor-
mance which does not meet minimum level of acceptability, and is not good 
enough to warrant recognition or greater responsibility." [d. Schmitt performed the 
appraisals and Schmitt's supervisor George Liakos approved them. [d. 
17. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1039 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
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the appraisal period. IS Believing he had performed competent-
ly, however, Turner claimed his supervisors gave him the ad-
verse rating in retaliation for his complaints. 19 
In July 1985, Liakos transferred Turner from the sales 
department to the delivery department.2o Although there was 
no change in salary, Turner believed the transfer was in retali-
ation for his complaints.21 Liakos claimed, however, that he 
had transferred Turner because of his problems performing in 
the sales department and because his experience made him 
more suited to the delivery department.22 
From December 1985 to November 1987, Turner received 
an overall rating of "good" in all performance appraisals.23 
However, in December 1988, Turner received a second overall 
evaluation of "needs improvement.,,24 Liakos stated that Turn-
er had recently become "an embittered and disgruntled em-
ployee" and that the performance appraisal reflected Turner's 
"uncooperative, confrontational" attitude toward management 
and his failure to timely complete assigned projects.25 
Turner, however, believed that his superiors had rated 
him unfavorably in retaliation for his continuing opposition to 
other improper activities he had observed while at the delivery 
department.26 Turner further believed that his superiors had 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 1040. In his new job, Turner's duties included supervising the day-
to-day activities of delivery department employees. [d. Turner was supervised by 
Steve Garcia, the delivery manager. [d. Garcia reported to Bill Richards, the oper-
ations manager, who, in turn, reported to George Liakos. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1040 
(Kennard, J., dissenting). 
21. [d. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. at 1040. Bill Richards made all of Turner's evaluations at the delivery 
department from 1985 to 1987. [d. In 1988, however, Steve Garcia and Richards 
made Turner's appraisal. [d. All of Turner's appraisals were approved by George 
Liakos. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1040 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
24. [d. A comparison of the 15 individual rating categories from 1987 and 
1988 revealed a dramatic change. [d. In his 1987 evaluation, Turner was rated 
"good" in eight categories, "very good" in six categories, and "excellent" in one 
category. [d. Turner did not receive a single "needs improvement" in any of the 15 
rating categories. Id. In the 1988 evaluation, however, Turner was rated "needs 
improvement" in eight categories and "good" in the remaining seven. [d. 
25. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1040 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
26. [d. at 1041. Turner specifically claimed that ABI was violating its union 
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used the evaluations to begin "setting him up" for termina-
tion.27 Turner alleged that ABI managers had used similar 
methods in the past to force other ABI employees to leave the 
company.28 As evidence of his superiors' intention to force him 
out, Turner cited his supervisors' failure to bring the incidents 
of poor performance to his attention when they occurred.29 
Shortly after receiving the 1988 appraisal, Turner ten-
dered his letter of resignation.30 In his declaration, Turner 
stated that he had resigned because he believed his "chances 
would be better" in future litigation if he preempted his even-
tual termination.31 
Shortly after his resignation, Turner filed suit against ABI 
and certain individuals alleging, inter alia, constructive wrong-
ful discharge in violation of public policy and breach of con-
tract.32 The trial court granted ABI's motion for summary 
contract by subcontracting the washing of delivery trucks to a company owned by 
delivery manager Steve Garcia, Turner's immediate supervisor. [d. Turner com-
plained to Garcia, Bill Richards and George Liakos. [d. In another incident, Turn-
er said he informed Liakos that ABI could be "in jeopardy" for withholding bene-
fits under a "health and welfare benefits" provision of a union contract. [d. Turner 
also believed ABI had violated the terms of some employment contracts that, in 
Turner's words, provided for the clerical staff to "be paid for 40 hours and work 
37 and a half." [d. Turner claimed to have complained to Liakos about this viola-
tion. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Turner also claimed to 
have complained that the delivery department was not following organizational 
policies regarding temperature control to prevent the spoilage of beer. [d. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. Turner recounted the case of an ABI employee Van Hoy who had re-
ported that some ABI employees had fabricated sales documents. [d. Although Van 
Hoy's report triggered an investigation, Van Hoy was subsequently given less re-
sponsibility and eventually left ABI. [d. at 1041 n.6 Turner also claimed that ABI 
had fabricated the performance appraisals of other ABI employees Bosman, Hock-
ing, Dunez (or Dunaj) and Peterson in attempts to coerce them to leave. Turner, 
876 P.2d at 1041 n.6. 
29. [d. at 1040-41. Turner claimed that, contrary to normal employment poli-
cies, his supervisors had only informed him about the incidents of poor perfor-
mance at the time of his performance review conference. [d. at 1042. 
30. [d. at 1025. 
31. [d. at 1032. 
32. [d. at 1025. Turner also alleged causes of action for age discrimination, 
and both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Turner, 876 
P.2d at 1025. ABI's motion for judgment on the pleadings resulted in the dismiss-
al of Turner's emotional distress claim. [d. Turner voluntarily dismissed his claim 
for age discrimination. [d. 
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judgment on both the public policy and breach of contract 
claims.33 
The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment as to the contract claim, but reversed on 
the public policy claim.34 The court held that Turner's com-
plaint adequately alleged the existence of constructive wrong-
ful discharge in violation of public policy.35 The court rea-
soned that a trier of fact could find that ABI deliberately creat-
ed intolerable working conditions based on Turner's "long list" 
of alleged actions and conditions.36 
On ABI's petition for review, the California Supreme Court 
reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment as to the public policy 
claim.37 Because the court found that no issue of material fact 
existed, the court reinstated the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment.3s 
III. BACKGROUND 
To maintain a claim for tortious constructive discharge, a 
plaintiff must prove: (1) an actual constructive discharge, and 
(2) an underlying tort claim against the employer.39 A con-
structive discharge occurs when an employee is forced to resign 
by employer actions or working conditions that are so intolera-
ble as to compel a reasonable employee to resign.40 Since the 
typical employment relationship is considered "at-will," a con-
structively discharged employee is not entitled to damages 
unless he or she can prove an underlying claim in either 
breach of contract or a tortious violation of public policy.41 
33. [d. 
34. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 656, 659 (Ct. App. 1992). 
35. [d. at 658. 
36. [d. 
37. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1024. 
38. [d. 
39. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022,1030 (Cal. 1994). 
40. [d. at 1025-27. 
41. [d. at 1030. A wrongfully discharged employee may sue to recover damages 
only if the public policy violated by the employer is fundamental and delineated in 
a statutory or constitutional provision. [d. See infra note 46 for statutory support 
and a definition of "at-will." See infra notes 63 - 75 for further discussion of viola-
tions of public policy in the constructive discharge context. While an employee 
6
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A. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 
When an employee resigns because of an employer's delib-
erate attempt to make employment conditions intolerable, a 
constructive discharge is deemed to have occurred.42 Since 
actual discharge carries significant legal consequences for 
employers,43 employers may attempt to avoid liability for 
wrongful discharge by engaging in conduct to force the employ-
ee to resign.44 While the employee is the one who actually 
claiming wrongful discharge may claim in either tort or breach of contract, the 
scope of this note is specifically limited to discussion of tortious wrongful discharge 
in violation of public policy. 
42. 30 C. J. S. Employer-Employee Relationship § 53 (1992). Conditions must 
be so intolerable that a reasonable person under the same circumstances would 
also feel compelled to resign. [d. 
43. Judicial holdings and legislative acts have given some discharged employ-
ees causes of action in either breach of contract or in tort or both. The California 
Supreme Court has recognized that employers may be liable if they discharge 
employees in violation of an implied contractual promise not to terminate without 
good cause or for breaching the parties' general duties of good faith and fair deal-
ing. Foley v. Interactive Data, 765 P.2d 373, 385, 401 (Cal. 1988). State and feder-
al statutes also impose liability upon employers for discharging employees under 
certain circumstances. For example, the California Fair Employment and Housing 
Act prohibits discharge because of race, religious creed, color, national origin, an-
cestry, physical or mental disability, medical condition, marital status, or sex. CAL. 
GoV'T CODE § 12921 (West Supp. 1996). Likewise, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and 1991 prohibits termination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1989). Both California and federal 
laws prohibit the discharge of a female because of pregnancy, childbirth, and relat-
ed medical conditions. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12945.2(1)(1) (West Supp. 1996»; 42 
U.S.C.S. § 2000e(k) (1989). California law also prohibits, for example, tennination 
of employees for exercising their rights under the Workers' Compensation laws, 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a(1) (West Supp. 1996); because of absence while serving as 
an election officer on election day, CAL. ELEC. CODE § 1655 (West Supp. 1996); be-
cause an employee takes time off to serve as a juror or appear as a witness, CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 230 (West 1989); because an employee has joined a labor union, CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1989); because an employee takes time off for emergency 
duty as a volunteer firefighter, CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.3 (West Supp. 1996); or be-
cause an employee in the private sector has refused to submit to a polygraph test, 
CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1989). Furthennore, the California Supreme Court 
has recognized that a employer will be liable in tort if it discharges an employee 
in violation of public policy. See infra notes 63 - 75 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of tortious wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 
Federal statutes also prohibit termination for a variety of reasons. For ex-
ample, an employer may not terminate an employee to avoid paying pension or 
welfare benefits, 29 U.S.C.S. § 1140 (1990); because an employee engages in union 
activity, 29 U.S.C.S. § 158(a)(1) (1988); or because an employee in the private 
sector refuses to submit to a polygraph test, 29 U.S.C.S. § 2002 (1990). 
44. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1025. 
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says, "I quit," the employer is deemed to have actually severed 
the employment relationship.45 
California law presumes an "at-will" relationship when the 
length of the employment relationship is not provided in the 
employment contract.4S Thus, even when an employer forces 
an employee to resign, the employee will typically have no 
cause of action against the employer even though the discharge 
is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation.47 To 
maintain an action in wrongful constructive discharge, there-
fore, an employee must show not only that he or she was 
forced to resign, but also that he or she is entitled to obtain 
damages for an underlying tort or for breach of contract.46 
Although California has long recognized that a resignation 
coerced by the employer is equivalent to a discharge,49 the 
California appellate courts did not define the elements of con-
structive discharge until 1987 in Brady v. Elixir Industries. 50 
In Brady, the plaintiff-employee contended not only that her 
employer's repeated sexual harassment forced her to resign, 
but also that her employer's actions constituted a tortious 
constructive discharge in violation of public policy.51 To estab-
lish constructive discharge, the Brady court held that an em-
ployee must show that actions of the employer or the condi-
tions of employment were so intolerable or aggravated at the 
time of the employee's resignation that a reasonable person in 
45. [d. 
46. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989). The California Labor Code defines an 
"at-will" employment contract as "(a)n employment, having no specified term (that) 
may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment 
for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month." 
[d. 
47. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1030 
48. [d. 
49. Moreno v. Cairns, 127 P.2d 914, 916 (Cal. 1942). 
Whenever a person is severed from his employment by 
coercion, the severance is effected not by his own will but 
by the will of a superior. A person who is forced to resign 
is thus in the position of one who is discharged, not of 
one who exercises his own will to surrender his employ-
ment voluntarily. 
[d. at 534-35. 
50. 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1987). 
51. [d. at 325. 
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the employee's position would also have resigned.52 Further-
more, the court also required that an employee bringing a 
constructive discharge claim prove that the employer had ei-
ther actual or constructive knowledge that the employee found 
the conditions of his or her job intolerable. 53 The California 
Courts of Appeal subsequently expanded the test developed in 
Brady to encompass contract as well as tort claims.54 Thus, a 
constructively discharged employee may sue for breach of both 
express employment contracts55 and implied covenants not to 
discharge without good cause or not to discharge except in 
accordance with specified procedures.56 
The Brady court discussed the constructive discharge stan-
dards of several jurisdictions, including the federal district and 
appellate courts, the California Fair Employment and Housing 
Commission and other states.57 Although these cases uniform-
ly required the circumstances of employment to be so aggravat-
ed or intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel com-
pelled to resign, courts take divergent views on whether an 
employee must have proof that the employer actually intended 
that the adverse conditions cause the employee to resign.58 
52. [d. at 328. 
53. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328. The Brady court held that an employee need 
not prove the employer intentionally created intolerable working conditions specifi-
cally to cause the employee to resign. [d. The court found proving employer intent 
too stringent a standard. [d. Thus, the court adopted the requirement that the 
employer at least have either actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged intol-
erable circumstances. [d. 
54. Zilmer v. Carnation, Co. 263 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1989); Soules v. 
Cadam, Inc., 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6 (Ct. App. 1991). 
55. Zilmer, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 426. 
56. Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11. 
57. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 327. 
58. [d. For cases not requiring proof of employer intent see, e.g., Calhoun v. 
Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561-563 (1st Cir. 1986); Goss v. Exxon Office 
Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984); Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 
F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361-362 
(9th Cir. 1987); Nolan v. Cleland, 686 F.2d 806, 813 (9th Cir. 1982); Derr v. Gulf 
Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343-344 (lOth Cir. 1986); Garner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
807 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1987); Civil Rights Div., etc. v. Vernick, etc., 643 
P.2d 1054, 1055 (Ariz. 1982); Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 714 P.2d 618, 
621 (Ore. App. 1986); Atlantic Richfield v. D. of Columbia Com'n, 515 A.2d 1095, 
1101 (D.C. App. 1986). For cases requiring some employer intent, see e.g., Bristow 
v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); Yates v. AVCO Corp., 
819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 
1256 (8th Cir. 1981); First Judicial, etc. v. Iowa, etc., 315 N.W.2d 83, 87-89 {Iowa 
9
Meckes: Constructive Discharge
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
684 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:675 
Like the majority of jurisdictions, the Brady court found that 
requiring the employee to prove the employer had actual 
knowledge or intent was too stringent a standard. 59 Neverthe-
less, the Brady court determined that some proof of employer 
knowledge is necessary to insure the parties at least attempt a 
peaceful, on-the-job resolution of the problem.60 Thus, the 
court a.dopted a middle-ground approach by requiring evidence 
that the employer had either actual or constructive knowl-
edge61 of the intolerable conditions.62 
B. DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
An employee suing for tortious constructive discharge 
must show not only intolerable conditions and employer knowl-
edge, but must also show that the discharge in question violat-
ed a firmly established, fundamental and substantial public 
policy expressed in constitutional or statutory provisions.63 
California's tortious discharge doctrine originated in 
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.54 In 
Petermann, an employer discharged its business agent for 
refusing to perjure himself before a state legislative commit-
tee.65 The court of appeal held that despite the employee's "at-
will" status, allowing the union to discharge the employee for 
refusing to violate the law would be "obnoxious to the interests 
of the state and contrary to public policy and sound morali-
ty."66 Similarly, in Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield CO.,67 the 
California Supreme Court held that an employer violated pub-
1982). 
59. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328. 
60. Id. 
61. The California Civil Code states that "Every person who has actual notice 
of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular 
fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting 
such inquiry, he might have learned such fact." CAL. CML CODE § 19 (West 
1982). 
62. Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328. 
63. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992). 
64. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. App. 1959). 
65.Id. 
66. Id. at 27. 
67. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980). 
10
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lic policy for firing an employee for refusing to participate in 
an illegal price fixing scheme.68 
The California courts have reached a different conclusion 
when the discharge did not violate a policy inuring to the pub-
lic at large but which, instead, served only the more limited 
interests of the employer itself.69 In Foley v. Interactive Data, 
Corp.,70 the employee claimed his employer violated public 
policy when it discharged him for informing his supervisor that 
a prospective managerial employee was under investigation for 
embezzlement.71 Although the employee contended that he 
had a duty to report this information as the employer's agent, 
the court found that the employer violated no public policy 
since the agency relationship between the parties was of no 
interest to the public at large.72 
The California Supreme Court further narrowed the kinds 
of actions that violate public policy in Gantt v. Sentry Insur-
ance.73 The court held that the employer's action must violate 
either a constitutional or statutory provision, reasoning that an 
employer ought to know when a public policy might be impli-
cated.74 Thus, a claim for tortious constructive discharge that 
does not implicate a fundamental public policy delineated in 
either a statutory or constitutional provision is subject to adju-
dication as a matter oflaw.75 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Turner,76 the California Supreme Court reanalyzed the 
California constructive discharge standard.77 Although the 
court confirmed that the employee's working conditions must 
68. [d. 
69. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988). 
70. [d. 
71. [d. at 375. 
72. [d. at 380. 
73. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 683-89 (Cal. 1992). 
74. [d. at 687. 
75. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033. 
76. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). 
77. [d. at 1025-28. 
11
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be objectively intolerable, the court modified the Brady 78 test 
by ruling that an employer must have actual knowledge of the 
employee's intolerable circumstances to support a constructive 
discharge claim.79 The Turner court also sought to clarify 
whether an employee could claim constructive discharge as a 
matter of law if the employee did not resign within a specified 
time period after the onset of the intolerable conditions.80 Fi-
nally, the court analyzed Turner's claim and found that 
Turner's claim failed as a matter of law for two reasons.81 The 
first "fatal flaw,,82 in Turner's claim was his inability to show 
that his working conditions were objectively intolerable.83 The 
court also found Turner's claim was untenable as a matter of 
law because he could show no connection between public policy 
violations by ABI and his eventual resignation. 54 
A. THE CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE TEST 
Before reviewing the merits of Turner's claim, the court 
reviewed the evolution of California's constructive discharge 
doctrine.85 The court attempted to clarify when circumstances 
would be so intolerable that they would compel an employee to 
resign.86 The court then considered whether an employee 
must prove the employer had actual knowledge, rather than 
mere constructive knowledge, that the employee considered his 
or her working conditions intolerable.87 In analyzing Turner's 
claim, the court considered and specifically disapproved case 
law that held an employee could not maintain a claim for con-
structive discharge if the employee failed to resign within a 
specific time period after the onset of the intolerable circum-
stances.88 
78. 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1987). 
79. Turner at 1028-29. 
80. Id. at 1031-32. 
81. Id. at 1031. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1031-32 
84. Id. at 1032-35. 
85. Turner v. Anheu8er-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1025-29 (Cal. 1994). 
86. Id. at 1027. See infra notes 89-94 and accompanying text. 
87. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1027-29. 
88. Id. at 1031. 
12
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1. Working conditions must be objectively "intolerable" 
To maintain a constructive discharge action, the court 
reiterated that the employee must show working conditions so 
objectively intolerable that they would have compelled a rea-
sonable employee under the same circumstances to resign.89 
The court noted, however, that all jobs have inherent frustra-
tions, challenges and disappointments.9o Therefore, an em-
ployee is protected only from unreasonably harsh conditions 
above and beyond those suffered by co-workers.91 The court 
ruled that single, trivial or isolated acts of misconduct will not 
usually make job conditions sufficiently intolerable to force an 
employee to resign.92 Instead, the proper focus is whether a 
reasonable person under the same circumstances would have 
had any reasonable alternative except to resign, not simply 
whether resignation was one reasonable option.93 Thus, the 
primary question is whether the employer has coerced the 
employee's resignation by subjecting the employee to intolera-
ble working conditions.94 
In determining whether intolerable conditions had com-
pelled Turner to resign, the court asked whether Turner's 
claim should be time-barred as a matter of law under the rule 
announced in Panopulos v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.95 Un-
89. [d. at 1027. For this test, the court relied on Slack v. Kanawha County 
Housing, 423 S.E.2d 547 (W.Va. 1992). The Slack court collected and analyzed 
state and federal cases from several jurisdictions. [d. at 555-58. The court discov-
ered general agreement that one essential element in any constructive discharge 
claim is proof that the employee's working conditions were so intolerable that any 
reasonable employee would resign rather than endure such conditions. [d. at 556. 
90. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026-27. 
91. [d. at 1027. 
92. [d. The court held that a "poor performance rating or a demotion, even 
when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive 
discharge." [d. See also Valdez v. City of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 726, 723 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (holding that failure to promote an employee due to unlawful discrimi-
nation will not support a finding of constructive discharge); Soules v. Cadam, Inc., 
3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 1991) (Holding that a demotion accompanied by re-
duction in pay and negative performance evaluations does not constitute construc-
tive discharge). 
93. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026. See also Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co., 23 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 793, 798 (Ct. App. 1993) (Holding that an employee who contended he 
was underpaid for a difficult executive position could not assert constructive dis-
charge claim). 
94. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1026-27. 
95. 264 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1989). In Panopulos, the plaintiff filed suit for 
13
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der Panopulos, a limitations period begins to run at the time 
the intolerable actions or conditions that caused the resigna-
tion become known to the employee.96 This time period tracks 
the statute of limitations for whatever cause of action the em-
ployee might have as a result of the intolerable circumstances. 
Under this rule, the employee claiming constructive discharge 
must have resigned within this time period, or his or her con-
structive discharge claim will fail as a matter of law.97 
The Turner, court rejected Panopulos finding that any reli-
ance on the applicable limitations period to determine whether 
employment conditions were indeed intolerable would be undu-
ly arbitrary.9s The court explained that although the length of 
time an employee remains on the job after the onset of intoler-
able circumstances may be a factor in determining whether 
working conditions were actually intolerable, an employee's 
failure to resign within this period does not prove the 
employee's resignation was unreasonable as a matter of law.99 
The Turner majority agreed with the Panopulos decision, how-
ever, to the extent that an "outer limit" exists after the onset 
of intolerable conditions beyond which an employee may not 
remain on the job and still claim constructive discharge. loo 
constructive discharge after resigning his job in 1983. [d. at 813. The plaintiff 
alleged that intolerable working conditions from 1978 until the time he resigned in 
1983 injured his psyche and his back. [d. The court held that too much time had 
passed between the onset of the intolerable circumstances and the employee's 
resignation. [d. at 817. The court wrote: "[T]he applicable limitations period must 
constitute an outer limit beyond which an employee may not, as a matter of law, 
remain employed after the onset of allegedly intolerable conditions and thereafter 
maintain a claim for wrongful constructive discharge." [d. The court reasoned that 
"sound policy requires that there be a limit beyond which claims such as that of 
plaintiff here may not be asserted." [d at 816. The court held his suit time-barred 
since the longest applicable limitations period was four years and the plaintiffs 
transfer had occurred more than four years before his resignation. 264 Cal. Rptr. 
at 816. 
96. [d. at 817. 
97. [d. 
98. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1031. 
99. [d. The Turner court only disapproved Panopulos to the extent that it pre-
scribed the statute of limitations as a time limit on an employee's decision to 
"weather the storm." [d. 
100. [d. 
14
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2. Employer must have actual knowledge of the employee's 
intolerable working conditions 
The Turner Court significantly modified the Brady test 
byallowing employees to proceed on a constructive discharge 
claim only if the employer has actual knowledge of the alleged 
intolerable working conditions.101 While the Brady line of cas-
es allowed a constructive discharge claim to proceed on an 
allegation the employer had actual or constructive knowledge 
of the employee's intolerable conditions, the Turner court ruled 
that the employee must prove that the employer either inten-
tionally created or knowingly permitted the intolerable work-
ing conditions to continue.102 The Turner majority found that 
this actual knowledge requirement better served the goal artic-
ulated in Brady of insuring the parties attempt to resolve the 
conflict before a lawsuit is required.103 
In Brady,l04 the court had required that the employer 
have either actual or constructive knowledge to ensure that the 
employer and an employee attempt a peaceful on-the-job reso-
lution of any workplace conflicts.105 The Turner court, howev-
er, stated that requiring the plaintiff to show that the employ-
er had actual notice of the intolerable conditions was a more 
appropriate standard if the courts wished the parties to work 
out their differences prior to the onset of a lawsuit. 106 The 
court reasoned that requiring employees to notify a person in 
authority about the intolerable situation would give employers, 
unaware of any problems, an opportunity to correct any objec-
tionable conditions or circumstances the employee finds objec-
tionable prior to legal action by the employee. 107 Further-
more, the court determined that the actual knowledge require-
ment would prevent employers from shielding themselves from 
101. [d. at 1028. For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or 
intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who effec-
tively represent the employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or su-
pervisory employees. [d. at 1029. 
102. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1029. 
103. [d. at 1028. 
104. [d. at 1029; Brady v. Elixer Indus., 242 Cal. Rptr. 324 (Ct. App. 1987). 
105. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1029 (citing Brady, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 328). 
106. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1029. 
107. [d. 
15
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constructive discharge lawsuits by deliberately ignoring a situ-
ation that has become intolerable to a reasonable employ-
ee. 108 Thus, the court concluded that the actual knowledge 
requirement would more effectively serve the favorable policies 
set forth in Brady. 109 
The Turner court based its modification of the knowledge 
requirement on the idea that constructive discharge is ulti-
mately a coerced resignation. llo While noting that proof that 
the employer intended to create intolerable working conditions 
would be evidence that the employer coerced the employee's 
resignation, III the court declined to require proof that the 
employer expressly intended to cause the resignation. l12 The 
court reasoned that requiring employees to produce evidence 
that the employer intended to constructively discharge them 
would preclude some meritorious claims since an employer is 
unlikely to announce a constructive discharge strategy "from 
the rooftops."1l3 On the other hand, the court reasoned an 
employer's actual knowledge of the existence of intolerable 
conditions and its failure to address them would be strong 
circumstantial evidence that the employee's resignation was, in 
fact, employer-coerced.1l4 
B. TuRNER'S CLAIM FOR CONSTRUCTIVE WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 
IN VIOLATION OF PuBLIC POLICY IS FATALLY FLAWED 
The court found two "fatal flaws" in Turner's claim for 
constructive wrongful discharge in violation of public poli-
cy.1l5 First, Turner presented insufficient evidence that his 
working conditions were so intolerable that they would have 
compelled a reasonable person under the same circumstances 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1027-28. 
111. Id. at 1028. 
112. Id. Although many federal and state courts do, in fact, require express 
proof that the employer intended to cause the employee's resignation. See supra 
notes 57 - 62 and accompanying text for further discussion of employer intent in 
this context. 
113. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1028. 
114. Id. 
115. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1031 (Cal. 1994). 
16
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to resign.116 Second, even assuming Turner could have shown 
intolerable working conditions, he could not show any relation-
ship between his whistle-blowing activities and his resignation 
and thus could not show ABI violated any public policy.ll7 
Standing alone, either of these flaws would have entitled ABI 
to summary judgment. 118 
1. Conditions of Turner's job were not aggravated or 
intolerable 
The Turner majority held that none of the following three 
conditions taken alone or together constituted sufficiently un-
der constructive discharge: (1) the illegal acts of Turner's fel-
low employees which he allegedly witnessed and reported in 
1984; (2) his 1985 reassignment; or (3) his low performance 
rating in 1988.119 Since none of these issues contained a tri-
able issue of material fact, the court found no merit in Turner's 
constructive discharge action. 120 
The court ruled that, without more, a reasonable employee 
should not be so offended by the "mere existence" of illegal 
conduct in the workplace that he or she would reasonably feel 
compelled to resign.l21 According to the majority, a reason-
able person in Turner's circumstances would not have felt com-
pelled to resign since Turner's supervisors had never required, 
or even requested, that he take part in any illegal activity.122 
Furthermore, violations of state law regulating the economic 
and contractual relationships between an alcoholic beverage 
manufacturer and its customers and competitors was not the 
kind of obnoxious or aggravated activity that might cause a 
reasonable employee to feel compelled to resign.123 
The fact that approximately three years had passed be-
116. ld. at 1031-32. 
117. ld. at 1032-34. 
118. ld. at 1031. 
119. ld. at 1031-32. 
120. ld. 
121. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032. 
122. ld. 
123. ld. The court noted that ABI had, in fact, taken action on some of 
Turner's complaints. ld. 
17
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tween Turner's reassignment to the delivery department (alleg-
edly in retaliation for his complaints about illegal activities) 
and his eventual resignation was found to be strong evidence 
indicating that neither Turner nor the hypothetical reasonable 
person would have regarded the working conditions at ABI as 
intolerable. 124 
The court also rejected Turner's claim that his 1988 perfor-
mance evaluation formed a basis for his constructive discharge 
claim. 125 Since a properly managed business must occasional-
ly review, criticize, demote, transfer, and discipline its employ-
ees,126 a single, negative performance rating should not cre-
ate circumstances so intolerable that a reasonable employee 
would be forced to resign.127 Thus, Turner could not claim 
that ABI managers had used negative performance appraisals 
to force him from the company.128 
Finally, the court determined that even considering all of 
the miscellaneous charges of misconduct together, no pattern 
of continuous harassment existed sufficient to maintain a 
claim for constructive discharge. 129 For more than three years 
after he had complained of illegal activity, Turner received 
good performance reviews and increases in compensation. ISO 
Moreover, the court noted, Turner had admitted resigning 
because he had thought ABI was "setting him up" for termina-
tion and he had believed he would fare better in future litiga-
tion if he were to preempt his discharge.13l Thus, the court 
concluded that Turner had resigned voluntarily since his work-
124. [d. See also Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 
1982) (holding that no constructive discharge occurs when alleged misconduct oc-
curred several months prior to resignation); Wagner v. Sanders Assoc., Inc., 638 F. 
Supp. 742 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that passage of time between allegedly intoler-
able condition and resignation "goes a long way toward destroying" assertion that 
conditions were intolerable). 
125. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032. 
126. [d. 
127. [d. See also Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that an 
employee claiming constructive discharge must show aggravating factors such as a 
continuous pattern of discrimination since, generally, a single, isolated incident of 
sexual harassment will not create sufficiently intolerable circumstances). 
128. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032. 
129. [d. 
130. [d. 
131. [d. 
18
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ing conditions could not have compelled him to resign if his 
resignation was strategic and not coerced.132 Thus, the court 
found Turner's failure to produce any evidence to show intoler-
able circumstances alone sufficient to defeat his constructive 
discharge claim. 133 
2. ABI did not violate public policy 
Even if Turner could have shown intolerable circumstanc-
es, the court ruled that summary judgment was proper since 
Turner had not shown that ABI had tortiously violated public 
policy. 1M To prove that a discharge violates public policy, the 
majority reiterated that an employee must show that the dis-
missal contravened a policy that is (1) fundamental/35 (2) 
beneficial to the public at large,136 and (3) embodied in a stat-
ute or constitutional provision.137 Tort claims of this type typ-
ically arise when ail employer discharges an employee for re-
fusing to violate a statute at the employer's request, for exer-
cising a statutory right or privilege, or for performing a legal 
duty. 138 
The court found that even if Turner could show that super-
visors had discharged him in retaliation for his complaints 
about ABI's internal practices or ABI's violations of its collec-
tive bargaining agreements, this did not amount to a violation 
of fundamental public policy since the benefit of these policies 
served only ABI or its employee unions and not the public at 
large. 139 The tort of wrongful discharge, the court stated, is 
not a tool for the enforcement of the employer's contracts or 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032-33. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 1032-33. The interest advanced by the policy must inure to the 
benefit of the public at large, rather than simply to the individual employer or 
employee. Id. See also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379-80 (Cal. 
1988) (holding that an employee discharged for complying with the fiduciary duty 
owed by an agent to his principle does not implicate public policy since the agency 
relationship does not benefit the public at large). 
137. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033; see also Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 
680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992). 
138. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033. 
139. Id. 
19
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internal policies.140 Therefore, because none of these activities 
involved a fundamental public policy, Turner's claim for con-
structive discharge based on these allegedly improper activities 
failed. 141 
Turner's allegation that his superiors violated the Califor-
nia Alcohol Beverage Control Act (hereinafter "ABC Act")142 
was likewise found insufficient to support his claim for con-
structive discharge. l43 The court first ruled Turner's implica-
tion of the ABC Act was insufficient to create a triable issue of 
material fact since he failed to provide citations to the specific 
statutory or constitutional authority giving rise to his public 
policy claim.l44 While the court found that retaliation for re-
porting violations of the ABC Act 'might involve a fundamental 
public policy/45 Turner's action still failed because he demon-
140. [d. 
141. [d. 
'142. The California Alcohol Beverage Control Act is codified in CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 23000 et seq (West 1985). 
143. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034. Turner complained that ABI personnel had vio-
lated the ABC Act by removing competitors' advertisements and by giving gifts to 
retailers. [d. 
144. [d. at 1033. Turner alleged that by giving gifts to retailers, ABI had vio-
lated "Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms laws." [d. Turner also alleged that ABI vio-
lated "ABC Act § 25503" by instructing its sales personnel to remove or tear down 
its competitors' products and advertising and making consignment sales of alcohol. 
[d. Although criticizing Turner for failing to cite specific statutes violated by ABI 
or citing incorrect statutory authority given the facts of this case, the court itaelf 
also cited incorrect statutory authority for the alleged violations. See supra note 13 
for further discussion of possible statutory provision allegedly violated by ABI. 
145. Although Turner simply claimed ABI violated "Alcohol, Tobacco and Fire-
arm laws," Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033, the California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act 
does prohibit wholesalers from giving gifts to liquor retailers. Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§§ 25502(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996), 25503(d) (West 1985). Interfering with a 
competitor's advertising display could be considered illegal ribbonizing under CAL. 
BuS. & PROF. CODE § 25502.3 as construed in Markstein Distributing v. Rice, 135 
Cal. Rptr. 255, 258 (Ct. App. 1976). 
In its declaration of purpose, the Alcohol Beverage Control Act states: 
This division is an exercise of the police powers of the 
State for the protection of the safety, welfare, health, 
peace, and morals of the people of the State, to eliminate 
the evils of unlicensed and unlawful manufacture, selling, 
and disposing of alcoholic beverages, and to promote tem-
perance in the use and consumption of alcoholic beverag-
es. It is hereby declared that the subject matter of this 
division involves in the highest degree the economic, so-
cial, and moral well-being and the safety of the State and 
of all its people. All provisions of this division shall be 
20
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strated no connection between his complaints and the negative 
performance appraisal that allegedly caused him to resign.l46 
The court noted that no evidence indicated that management 
had regarded him as a disloyal employee or a troublemaker 
despite his reporting activity during the three-year period 
between Turner's transfer and his resignation. l47 Also impor-
tant to the Turner majority was the fact that ABI had not 
simply dismissed Turner's complaints out-of-hand. l48 Instead, 
ABI had investigated Turner's complaints and had made its 
own determinations that no illegal activity had taken 
place.149 The court concluded that because no apparent con-
nection was shown between the alleged ABC Act violations and 
Turner's 1988 performance appraisal, the only reasonable 
inference was that Turner's negative appraisal simply reflected 
a bona fide assessment of his job performance and did not 
implicate a fundamental public policy.150 
v. DISSENTING OPINION 
In Turner, Justice Kennard dissented from both the 
majority's decision to require an employer's actual knowledge 
in a constructive discharge claim,151 and the majority's rein-
liberally construed for the accomplishment of these pur-
poses. 
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, § 23001 (West 1985). 
146. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 1034-35. 
151. Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc. 876 P.2d 1022, 1035-43 (Cal. 1994). (per 
Kennard, J., dissenting, joined by Woods J. and joined in part by Mosk, J.) 
Justice Mosk, joining Justice Kennard's dissent, criticized the court for aban-
doning the constructive knowledge component of the constructive discharge test. Id. 
at 1035. Mosk also stated that he was in accord with Justice Kennard on the 
question of whether ABI's illegal marketing practices in 1984 contributed to cause 
Turner's resignation in 1988. Id. 
Justice Mosk, however, concurred with the majority's decision because he 
believed Turner did not suffer objectively intolerable conditions of employment as a 
matter of law. Id. Mosk reasoned that Turner's single "needs improvement" perfor-
mance appraisal after four years of good evaluations did warrant his belief that he 
would subsequently receive a series of poor performance appraisals that would blot 
his employment record. Id. Furthermore, Mosk believed Turner's "damaging" ad-
mission that he had resigned for strategic reasons was further evidence that his 
working conditions were not "intolerable.» Id. at 1035. 
21
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statement of the trial court's grant of summary judgment.152 
Instead, she argued that the courts should hold an employer 
responsible when proof is offered that the employer had con-
structive as well as actual knowledge of intolerable working 
conditions. 153 Furthermore, she argued summary judgment 
was improper since Turner had presented sufficient evidence 
for a jury to conclude that an orchestrated campaign to force 
him from his job made his work conditions objectively intolera-
ble. IM Finally, despite the majority's finding to the contrary, 
the dissent argued that Turner had indeed presented sufficient 
evidence to prove a causal relationship between ABI's alleged 
violations of the ABC Act in 1984 and Turner's 1989 resigna-
tion.155 
A. CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE STANDARD SUPPORTED IN LAw 
AND REASON 
Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's decision to 
require actual employer knowledge as an element of a con-
structive discharge claim for two reasons.156 First, employer 
knowledge was not at issue in Turner since Turner had alleged 
his employers actually intended to drive him from the compa-
ny.157 Second, the actual knowledge requirement adopted in 
Turner erroneously departed from the test uniformly applied 
by the California appellate courts and supported by jurispru-
dence on both the state and federal levels.15s 
The dissent first contended that this case was an improper 
vehicle for modifying the standard of employer knowledge since 
the issue of whether ABI had constructive or actual knowledge 
152. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1038-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
153. [d. at 1036-38. 
154. [d. at 1041-42. 
155. [d. at 1042-43. 
156. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1036-38 (Cal. 1994) 
(Kennard, J., dissenting). 
157. [d. at 1036. 
158. [d. Prior to Turner the following California opinions had adopted the test 
for constructive discharge developed in Brady v. Elixer Indus., 242 Cal. Rptr. 328 
(Ct. App. 1987): Rochlis v. Walt Disney Co. 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 793, 798 (Ct. App. 
1993), Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 10 (Ct. App. 1991), Valdez v. City 
of Los Angeles, 282 Cal. Rptr. 726, 735-36 (Ct. App. 1991), Zilmer v. Carnation 
Co., 263 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425-26 (Ct. App. 1989) 
22
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was not at issue. 159 Because Turner alleged that his supervi-
sors had intended their actions to lead to his eventual termina-
tion, the dissent reasoned that Turner had alleged ABI had 
actual knowledge. 160 The issue of an employer's constructive 
knowledge should arise only in cases where the employee's 
allegedly intolerable working conditions were unknown to the 
employing company's management or the employee's supervi-
sors. 161 
The dissent next contended that proof of constructive 
knowledge is appropriate where an employer is responsible for 
an employee's resignation. Kennard reasoned that if an em-
ployer is responsible for working conditions so intolerable they 
force an employee to resign, the employer has sufficient notice 
to be liable in a constructive discharge claim.162 For authori-
ty, Justice Kennard cited the constructive discharge standard 
applied by federal courts in sexual harassment claims brought 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter 
"Title VII,,).l63 Under what Kennard characterized as the 
"majority rule" in Title VII cases, an employee is constructively 
discharged when intolerable working conditions "for which the 
employer is responsible" cause the employee to resign.l64 
159. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1036 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 1036-37. 
163. Id. at 1036-37. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is codified in 42 
U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq. (l989). 
164. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1036 (Kennard, J., dissenting; emphasis by Justice 
Kennard). Kennard attributes her assertion that employer "responsibility" is an 
element of the constructive discharge tests employed by a majority of the federal 
circuits to BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT IN EM-
PLOYMENT LAw 260 (1992). Lindemann and Kadue cite several sexual harassment 
cases as authority for the proposition that employer responsibility for the intolera-
ble conditions will support a constructive discharge claim under federal civil rights 
laws. Id. Whether the employer had any knowledge, actual or constructive, was 
not central to Lindemann and Kadue's analysis, however. Instead, the question 
explored by Lindemann and Kadue is whether an employee must necessarily prove 
the employer's intent to cause the employee's resignation. Id. 
Only one case cited by Lindemann and Kadue accorded with Justice 
Kennard's views on employer responsibility. In Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., the court 
held that employment conditions that were foreseeably intolerable to the employer 
would support employer responsibility for an employee's resignation. 796 F.2d 340, 
344 (lOth Cir. 1986). Lindemann and Kadue also cite Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., 
747 F.2d 885, 887 (3d Cir. 1984), for the proposition that employer intent is not 
required in finding a constructive discharge. LINDEMANN & KAnUE, supra at 260 
23
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Kennard looked to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's (hereinafter "EEOC") guidelines implementing 
Title VII for an explanation of when an employer is responsible 
for an employee's resignation. 165 The EEOC guidelines pro-
vide that an employer is responsible for sexual or racial ha-
rassment any time the employer (or its agents or supervisory 
employees) knew or should have known of harassment in the 
workplace, unless the employer can prove that it took appro-
priate immediate corrective action. 166 Kennard asserted that 
every federal appellate court that has considered this issue has 
found that, absent prompt remedial action, an employer with 
only constructive knowledge is responsible for abusive 
workplace conditions. 167 Furthermore, the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Act (hereinafter "FEHA")168 also 
imposes liability on an employer who fails to take corrective 
action when it has actual or constructive knowledge of racial, 
sexual and other forms of harassment by co-workers.169 Thus, 
n.41. The Goss court, however, implied that the employer's actual knowledge of 
the employee's intolerable circumstances was a prerequisite in proving constructive 
discharge. "The court need merely find that the employer knowingly permitted 
conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person 
subject to them would resign." Goss, 747 F.2d at 888. Thus, the "element" of em-
ployer responsibility encompassing both constructive and actual knowledge cited by 
Kennard is not supported by Lindemann and Kadue's analysis. See LINDEMANN & 
KADUE, supra at 260. 
165. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 et seq. (1993). 
166. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1037 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.11(d) 
(delineating employer liability for sexual harassment), 1606.8(d) (delineating em-
ployer liability for harassment because of national origin) (1993). 
167. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1037 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The federal courts have 
held employers responsible for workplace harassment when the employer knew or 
should have known about abusive workplace conditions involving harassment based 
on race or sex. See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 900-01 
(1st Cir. 1988); Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr, Inc. 957 F.2d 59, 63 
(2d Cir. 1992); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 
1990); Nash v. Electrospace System, Inc., 9 F.3d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1993); 
Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1992); 
Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 320 (7th Cir. 
1992); Hall v. Gus Const. Co., 842 F.2d lOlD, 1015 (8th Cir. 1988); Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991); Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections 
Dept., 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc. 867 
F.2d 1311, n. 1 (11th Cir. 1989). 
168. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12900 et seq. (West 1989). 
169. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1037 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The California Govern-
ment Code provides: "[hlarassment of an employee or applicant by an employee 
other than an agent or supervisor shall be unlawful if the entity, or its agents or 
supervisors, knows or should have known of this conduct and fails to take immedi-
24
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the dissent concluded that the constructive knowledge compo-
nent of the Brady test for constructive discharge is supported 
by analogous authority under Title VII and FEHA.170 
The dissent argued that maintaining the constructive 
knowledge standard was appropriate because circumstances 
may exist where an employer should be liable despite having 
only constructive knowledge. Kennard reasoned that when the 
hostile work environment is created by the complaining 
employee's co-workers or subordinates, an employer will often 
have only constructive knowledge. l71 Furthermore, an em-
ployer has constructive knowledge if it does not give the em-
ployee any means to complain, discourages complaints or fails 
to read or take employee complaints.172 When these condi-
tions are so obvious and pervasive that they should draw the 
attention of a reasonably attentive employer, then the employ-
er has constructive knowledge. 173 Thus, Kennard argued that 
sound public policy and analogous legal authority support 
maintaining the Brady standard of employer knowledge. 174 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPROPER 
Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's conclusion 
that Turner could not show objectively intolerable working 
conditions or that a nexus existed between ABI's public policy 
violations and Turner's resignation. 175 While Justice Kennard 
conceded that the evidence of Turner's intolerable working 
conditions was not overwhelming, summary judgment was 
improper since sufficient triable issues of material fact re-
mained.176 Specifically, the dissent contended that Turner's 
supervisors may still have regarded him as a disloyal employee 
despite the fact that a significant amount of time had passed 
ate and appropriate corrective action." CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12940(h)(1) (West Supp. 
1996). 
170. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1038 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
171. [d. at 1037-38. 
172. [d. at 1038. 
173. [d. 
174. [d. 
175. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1038 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, 
J., dissenting). 
176. Id. at 1042. 
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between Turner complaints about statutory violations. 177 
Thus, Kennard contended that the majority erred in finding 
that Turner's claim did not implicate public policy because he 
could not establish any link between his resignation and ABl's 
statutory violations. 178 
1. Intolerable conditions 
The dissent argued that a reasonable employee might have 
found his employer's efforts to force him from his job or set 
him up for termination might be so intolerable as to compel 
him to resign.179 Although Justice Kennard agreed with the 
majority that negative performance appraisals do not indepen-
dently create the type of conditions necessary to support a 
constructive discharge claim, she argued that a campaign to 
drive an employee from employment could well meet this stan-
dard. lso 
Kennard found that Turner had presented sufficient tangi-
ble evidence to support his claim that he was driven to re-
sign.181 For instance, Turner had offered uncontradicted evi-
dence that his supervisors never mentioned any of the inci-
dents of poor performance described in Turner's 1988 perfor-
mance appraisal at the time that they had allegedly oc-
curred. 182 Since this was contrary to normal and sound per-
sonnel practices, the dissent gave credence to Turner's claim 
that he was being "set up" for termination. 183 Furthermore, 
Turner had produced evidence that ABI had used similar 
methods to force resignations on other occasions. l84 Kennard 
also found it inexplicable that Turner had suddenly become an 
unsatisfactory employee after four years of receiving uniformly 
good performance evaluations. 185 
177. [d. at 1043. 
178. [d. 
179. [d. at 1042. 
180. [d. 
181. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041-42 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
182. [d. at 1042. 
183. [d. 
184. [d. 
185. [d. 
26
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The dissent found this evidence sufficient for a trier of fact 
to find that ABI had, indeed, used a systematic campaign to 
drive Turner from his job.186 A reasonable employee, knowing 
the poor evaluations would continue, eventually lead to dis-
charge, and also might lead to reduced employment prospects 
in the future, might very well find the situation so intolerable 
as to warrant resignation, the dissent argued. 187 
2. Nexus between Turner's 1989 resignation and ABI's 1984 
statutory violations 
Justice Kennard contended that Turner had produced 
sufficient triable evidence that ABI may have forced his 1989 
resignation at least partially in retaliation for his 1984 whis-
tle-blowing activities. ISS ABI manager George Liakos may 
have tolerated or encouraged the illegal conduct alleged by 
Turner because it may have increased company sales. 189 
Thus, the dissent argued, a reasonable jury could infer that 
Turner's supervisor's ordered his 1985 transfer to prevent him 
from observing any further illegal or improper activities. 190 
The dissent also maintained that a jury could trace a causal 
sequence from Turner's initial complaints, through his contin-
ued agitation while assigned to the delivery department, and 
finally to the negative performance appraisal which he claimed 
had caused him to resign.19l Thus, the dissent found Turner's 
evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment on the issue of 
whether his supervisors had endeavored either to "set him up" 
for termination or to force him to resign. 192 
186. [d. 
187. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
188. [d. at 1042-43. The majority held that one reason Turner's constructive 
discharge claim failed was that he could not establish a nexus between his com-
plaints about illegal activities in 1984 and his resignation in 1989. [d. at 1032. 
The court ruled that any connection between the events of 1984 and Turner's 
resignation was obliterated by the good performance appraisals Turner received 
during the interim. [d. Moreover, the majority found Turner's statement that he 
resigned because he thought he would fare better in litigation a strong indication 
that no connection existed. [d. 
189. Id. at 1042-43. 
190. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
191. [d. at 1043. 
192. Id. 
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Justice Kennard, found the four-year interval between 
Turner's initial complaints and his eventual resignation not so 
temporally distant as to summarally eliminate a causal infer-
ence.193 Whether Turner's complaints regarding the 1984 
statutory violations had "marked" him as a disloyal employee 
was a question properly left for the jury.194 The dissent found 
it entirely plausible that a legally sophisticated employer 
might allow some time to pass before reinstigating a campaign 
to force an employee to resign or be fired. 195 
Although retaliation for Turner's complaints regarding 
violations of union contracts and internal company policies 
would not have violated public policy,196 the dissent contend-
ed that Turner's complaints may have given his superiors 
continuing grounds to regard him as a disloyal employee and 
troublemaker. 197 Thus, Turner's belief that his supervisors 
were attempting to force him from the company through ad-
verse performance appraisals was amply supported by the 
evidence. 198 
To demonstrate the required "nexus," Kennard argued, 
Turner need only prove that his December 1988 performance 
appraisal was given partially in retaliation for his opposition to 
statutory violations in 1984.199 However, if the 1988 perfor-
mance appraisal was given solely in retaliation for improper 
practices that did not involve statutory violations, Kennard 
would agree with the majority that Turner's constructive dis-
charge did not violate a public policy.200 In Kennard's view, 
however, the potentially mixed motives of Turner's supervisors 
193. [d: at 1043. The majority opinion did not dispute that giving gifts to re-
tailers and encouraging employees to remove competitors' advertisements violated 
the Alcohol Beverage Control Act. Id. at 1042. The majority also did not dispute 
that discharging an employee in retaliation for opposition to such activities would 
have violated public policy. [d. 
194. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1043 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
195. [d. 
196. [d. at 1042, n. 7. Justice Kennard agreed with the majority's conclusion 
that violations of collective bargaining agreements and internal company policies 
did not violate fundamental public policy. Id. 
197. Id. at 1043 
198. [d. 
199. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
200. [d. 
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presented an issue of material fact properly left to the trier of 
fact.201 
VI. CRITIQUE 
The Turner court erred in reinstating the trial court's 
summary judgment order in favor of ABI because the majority 
incorrectly decided or refused to resolve three triable issues of 
material fact.202 First, the court incorrectly decided as a mat-
ter of law that Turner's supervisors did not engage in a cam-
paign to force him from his job even though Turner had pro-
duced sufficient evidence to warrant a trial on the issue of his 
supervisor's motives.203 Second, the court never reached the 
issue of whether such a campaign might have created intolera-
ble circumstances since the court incorrectly found that 
Turner's supervisors did not attempt to coerce or harass him to 
resign.204 Finally, the court improperly decided as a matter of 
law that ABI did not give Turner unfavorable performance 
appraisals in retaliation for his complaints about violations of 
the ABC Act in 1984 and thus did not implicate fundamental 
public policy.205 
201. Id. at 1043. 
202. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). The California 
Code of Civil Procedure provides: 
The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all 
the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining 
whether the papers show that there is no triable issue as 
to any material fact the court shall consider all of the 
evidence set forth in the papers, except that to which 
objections have been made and sustained by the court, 
and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, 
except summary judgment shall not be granted by the 
court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the 
evidence, if contradicted by other inferences or evidence, 
which raise a triable issue as to any material fact. 
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c) (West 1995). Thus, a defendant moving for summary 
judgment must show facts negating all causes of action on all theories contained 
in the complaint. Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98, 102 
(1982). Because summary judgment is seen as a drastic remedy, the court should 
resolve doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party 
opposing the motion. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 563 (Cal. 1968). 
203. See infra Section IV.A. for further discussion. 
204. See infra Section IV.B. for further discussion. 
205. See infra Section IV.C. for further discussion. 
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These errors are significant because they demonstrate the 
Turner majority's failure to recognize that an employer might 
use fabricated performance appraisals to force an employee to 
resign, or, alternatively, to justify a wrongful discharge. Fur-
thermore, courts will now likely find that a whistle-blowing 
employee's constructive discharge was unrelated to the 
employee's complaints if sufficient time has passed between 
the complaints and the forced resignation. Thus, employees 
facing a similar situation are likely doomed to adverse judg-
ment as a matter of law since they will be unable to prove the 
required "nexus,,206 between their complaints and their forced 
resignation. 
A. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE A TRIABLE 
ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINED AS TO WHETHER ABI 
MANAGERS USED FABRICATED PERFORMANCE APPRAlSALS 
TO FORCE TURNER'S RESIGNATION 
With very little discussion, the Turner majority dismissed 
Turner's claim that his 1988 performance appraisal had been 
part of a concerted effort to orchestrate his discharge or resig-
nation.207 The court stated that Turner's claim amounted to 
nothing more than an attempt to "weave unrelated and dis-
jointed events together into an insidious pattern" which quick-
ly unraveled under the circumstances.2os Furthermore, the 
court found that Turner had presented insufficient evidence to 
prove that any ABI managers had regarded Turner as a disloy-
al employee.209 The court also noted that the ABI managers 
responsible for Turner's earlier negative evaluations were no 
longer on the scene.210 Moreover, the prompt investigation of 
Turner's complaints undertaken by ABI further dispelled any 
notion there was a concerted effort to harass Turner.21l The 
court also found that Turner had resigned voluntarily for stra-
tegic reasons and thus could not show that his supervisors had 
coerced or compelled him to leave ABI.212 The court found the 
206. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032. 
207. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1032 (Cal. 1994). 
208. [d. 
209. [d. at 1034. 
210. [d. 
211. Id. at 1034. 
212. Turner, P.2d at 1032. Turner admitted resigning when he did because he 
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favorable performance ratings Turner had received during the 
period of more than three years between the events of 1984 
and his 1988 negative performance appraisal strong evidence 
that no mischief was afoot.213 The court concluded that 
Turner's 1988 negative evaluation could reflect only a bona 
fide assessment of Turner's job performance and could not 
have constituted an attempt at reprisaL214 
The majority's examination of the facts, however, failed to 
sufficiently address the contradictory evidence offered by Turn-
er to show a genuine issue as to whether Turner's negative 
appraisals objectively evaluated Turner's performance or 
whether ABI managers had used them to "set up" Turner for 
discharge.215 In contrast, Justice Kennard's dissent correctly 
concluded that Turner had produced sufficient evidence to 
create a triable issue of material fact and thus avoid summary 
judgment.216 Based on the evidence presented by Turner, a 
jury could have found that ABI had engaged in conduct de-
signed to force to Turner to resign or to "set him up" for dis-
charge.217 
In support of his claim, Turner presented evidence that 
the unfavorable performance appraisals in both 1984 and 1988 
came on the heels of his complaints about improper practices 
at ABI. 218 Turner claimed that he did not deserve the unfa-
vorable ratings since his performance at ABI had been of con-
sistently high quality.219 Moreover, Turner argued that his 
supervisors' failure to discuss instances of poor performance 
with him when they occurred was further proof that his super-
thought his "chances would be better" in future litigation if he preempted his 
discharge. [d. 
213. [d. 
214. [d. at 1034-35. 
215. [d. at 1041-42 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard argued that Turn-
er had produced sufficient evidence to show that his supervisors had engaged in a 
campaign to force him from his job. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041-42 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting). Any evidence supplied by the defendants, Kennard asserted, simply estab-
lished the existence of a triable issue of fact. [d. 
216. See id. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the court must consid-
er the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judg-
ment. Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n, 762 P.2d 46, 63 (Cal. 1988). 
217. See supra note 218. 
218. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
219. [d. 
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visors had been intent on forcing his departure from ABI since 
such conduct was not in line with normal personnel practic-
es.220 Turner also recounted how ABI had retaliated against 
another employee (Van Hoy) for complaining about improper 
activities on the job.221 Thus, a trier of fact could have in-
ferred that ABI had given Turner the negative performance 
appraisals to further some illegitimate goal and not objectively 
assess his job performance. 222 
Furthermore, Turner produced anecdotal evidence that 
ABI had used negative performance appraisals in the past to 
force other employees to resign their positions.223 Turner de-
scribed three instances where ABI used fabricated performance 
appraisals to encourage specific employees to resign.224 Thus, 
Turner presented at least some evidence that ABI supervisors 
were inclined to use fabricated performance appraisals to force 
employees to resign. 
Even though different managers had appraised Turner in 
1984 and 1988, this fact should not have undercut Turner's 
claim because each manager reported to the same individual 
general manager.225 While different individuals supervised 
Turner at each department, each supervisor, in turn, reported 
to George Liakos, the general manager. 226 Liakos was not on-
ly in Turner's direct chain of command, but was also involved 
in all of Turner's appraisals and was responsible for Turner's 
1985 transfer.227 
As Justice Kennard correctly maintained, a jury could 
have concluded that Liakos transferred Turner to the delivery 
department in 1985 so that Turner would not continue to draw 
attention to profitable but illegal activities occurring in the 
220. [d. 
221. [d. at 1041 n. 6. 
222. See id. at 1042. Justice Kennard found sufficient evidence for a trier of 
fact to detennine that Liakos, Schmitt and Garcia had conspired to tenninate 
Turner to prevent him from continuing his complaints regarding violations of the 
ABC Act and ABI's internal policies. [d. 
223. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041 n.6 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
224. [d. 
225. [d. at 1034. 
226. Id. at 1040. 
227. [d. at 1039-40. 
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sales department.228 The jury could further infer that 
Turner's continued complaints while assigned to the delivery 
department led Turner's supervisors to embark on a campaign 
to force him to resign.229 Moreover, the assertion that ABI 
managers were likely to use performance appraisals to harass 
employees had sufficient evidentiary support since Turner 
alleged that ABI had taken similar action in the past.230 
Turner had also produced sufficient evidence to create a 
triable issue of fact as to whether his supervisors at ABI used 
his performance appraisals to force him to resign. Byoverlook-
ing evidence produced by the Turner, the Turner majority 
incorrectly found Turner's appraisals to be objective perfor-
mance evaluations.231 However, even if Turner could have 
shown that his supervisors gave him the performance apprais-
als in retaliation for his complaints, Turner's supervisors' con-
duct would only have amounted to a constructive discharge if 
his working conditions had become so intolerable that he 
would have felt compelled or coerced to resign.232 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INCORRECT BECAUSE ABI's 
EFFORT TO FORCE TuRNER To RESIGN MAy HAVE BEEN 
INTOLERABLE 
Since the Turner court concluded that no ABI supervisors 
had tried to force Turner's resignation, the majority never 
reached the issue of whether such a situation would be suffi-
ciently intolerable to compel a reasonable person to resign.233 
By focusing only on minor parts of Turner's overall claim, the 
court incorrectly concluded that Turner's resignation was un-
justified because his employment conditions were not intolera-
228. Id at 1042. 
229. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
230. See supra notes 224 - 227 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
231. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034. The fact that Turner's performance apprais-
als appeared objective "on their face" and the fact that three years had passed be-
tween Turner's complaints about illegal activities and the time he received the 
negative performance appraisal in 1988 was sufficient for the Turner majority to 
determine that Turner's negative performance appraisal was simply a bona fide 
assessment of his job performance. Id. 
232. Id. at 1026-27. 
233. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1994). 
33
Meckes: Constructive Discharge
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996
708 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:675 
ble as a matter of law.234 By taking this myopic view, the ma-
jority failed to consider whether an employee is justified to 
resign when faced with virtually certain termination in the 
near future. 235 
In contrast, other courts considering constructive discharge 
claims have found that imminent termination creates working 
conditions sufficiently intolerable that a reasonable person 
would feel compelled to resign. For example, in Lopez v. S.B. 
Thomas, Inc.,236 an employee claimed that his employer con-
structively discharged him when his supervisor told him that 
he would be discharged in 90 days. The court held that such a 
statement by an employer alone suffices to present a triable 
issue as to whether a constructive discharge had occurred.237 
Likewise, in Welch v. University of Texas & Its Marine Science 
Institute,238 a professor told his graduate research assistant 
that she would have to resign after being awarded her doctor-
ate since the professor believed a female with an advanced 
degree was inappropriate for the position. The court held that 
the trial court had not erred in finding constructive discharge 
since "a reasonable person would certainly resign employment 
after being ordered to leave. "239 
234. [d. at 1032 (concluding that Turner'8 resignation was voluntary and strate-
gic, not coerced or compelled). 
235. See id. at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard argued that a 
trier of fact could find a campaign to force an employee to resign would be objec-
tively intolerable and could compel a reasonable employee to resign. [d. The ma-
jority, however, reviewed only parts of the alleged "campaign" with regard to their 
intolerability. C.f Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 562-63, 564 
(1st Cir. 1986). In Calhoun, the court held that the courts should focus on the 
overall circumstances in determining whether employment conditions are intolera-
ble. [d. The court chastised the court below for applying a "divide and conquer" 
approach to determining intolerability. [d. Likewise, in Turner, the court divided 
Turner's claim of intolerable working conditions into its most tolerable elements. 
The court found that, alone, neither observing illegal acts, Turner, 876 P.2d at 
1034, observing violations of ABI's internal procedures, id. at 1033, nor being 
subjected to unfavorable performance appraisals, id. at 1032, were sufficiently 
egregious to amount to intolerable circumstances. As noted by Justice Kennard in 
her dissent, however, Turner's claim was that these elements simply went toward 
proving that Turner's supervisors had engaged in a campaign to force him from 
his job. [d. at 1041-42. Thus, like the court below in Calhoun, the Turner court 
divided Turner's claim into subparts that are much easier to swallow. 
236. 831 F.2d ll84, ll88 (2d Cir. 1987). 
237. [d. 
238. 659 F.2d 531, 534 (5th Cir. 1981). 
239. [d. 
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Similarly, Justice Kennard's dissent recognized that the 
proper issue was whether an attempt to coerce an employee to 
resign by using deliberately fabricated performance appraisals 
would amount to objectively intolerable circumstances.240 
Since the degree of intolerability is measured by an reason-
able-person standard, courts have recognized that the issue of 
whether an action or condition of employment is intolerable is 
normally a question of fact best left for the jury.241 Courts 
have also recognized, however, that situations may exist where 
an employee's decision to resign is unreasonable as a matter of 
law.242 
The Turner court held that Turner's case fell among the 
latter since his working conditions were not intolerable as a 
matter of law.243 First, the court concluded that Turner's ex-
posure to illegal and improper activities at the workplace was 
not intolerable since the nature of the conduct was not obnox-
ious or aggravated enough to cause a reasonable employee to 
resign.244 Furthermore, the court found that Turner could not 
claim the illegal acts he observed in 1984 created intolerable 
circumstances in 1989 when Turner resigned.245 Rather than 
asking whether· a reasonable person would feel compelled to 
resign if faced with imminent dismissal, the court instead 
mistakenly focused on whether the illegal acts Turner wit-
nessed or whether Turner's adverse performance appraisals 
standing alone created intolerable working conditions.246 Al-
240. Kennard wrote: 
The question, then, is not whether one, or even two, ad· 
verse perfonnance reviews justify an employee's decision 
to resign. Rather, the issue is whether a reasonable em· 
ployee would find working conditions intolerable, and feel 
compelled to resign, when the employee's supervisors had 
launched a campaign to drive the employee out of the 
company by means of adverse perfonnance evaluations, 
based on charges deliberately fabricated. 
Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
241. See, e.g., Thomas v. Douglas, 877 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1989), Soules 
v. Cadam, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6, 11 (Ct. App. 1991), Valdez v. City of Los Angeles, 
282 Cal. Rptr. 726, 733 (Ct. App. 1991). 
242. See, e.g., Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 11; Valdez, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 733. 
243. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032. 
244. [d. 
245. [d. 
246. See id. (holding that Turner could not show intolerable circumstances from 
the evidence produced). 
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though the Turner court correctly decided that Turner's nega-
tive performance appraisals independently did not create an 
objectively intolerable situation,247 the court failed to consider 
whether employers might use fabricated appraisals as a mes-
sage to employees that they have no future with the company 
and thereby creating intolerable working conditions for the 
employee.248 
The Turner court relied on Soules v. Cadam, Inc. 249 as 
support for the proposition that an employer must, from time 
to time, evaluate and criticize its employees if it wishes to 
function as an efficient business enterprise.250 In Soules, the 
employee claimed she was constructively discharged because 
she was given a negative performance appraisal accompanied 
by a demotion.251 Soules is distinguishable, however, because 
the Soules' employer had not intended the negative appraisal 
to cause Soules to resign.252 Unlike the plaintiff in Soules, 
Turner alleged that his supervisors had intended to use the 
appraisal to force him from the company and not as part of a 
remedial company policy designed to promote workplace effi-
ciency.253 Thus, the court failed to address the central issue 
framed by Turner: whether imminent discharge is sufficiently 
intolerable to cause a reasonable employee to resign. 
Although the majority opinion is unclear as to whether a 
constructive discharge of an employee through the use of fabri-
cated performance appraisals is possible,254 the Turner deci-
sion provides unscrupulous employers legal ammunition to use 
performance appraisals in a similar manner. Under the Turner 
decision, employers may be able to avoid litigating the merits 
247. Id at 1032. The Turner majority noted that "every employer must on occa-
sion [use performance appraisals to] review, criticize, demote, transfer, and disci-
pline employees" in order to properly manage its business. Id (citations omitted). 
248. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042. (Kennard, J. dissenting). Kennard contended 
that Turner produced sufficient evidence that his supervisors engaged in such 
underhanded tactics to force him from his job. Id. 
249. 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 6 (1991). 
250. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032; Soules, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 12. 
251. Id. at 9. 
252. Id. In fact, after the employee had resigned, the employer informed her by 
mail that she was "absolutely welcome" to return to her job. Id. 
253. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1041 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
254. See id. at 1036 (Mosk J., concurring and dissenting). 
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of constructive discharge claims where an employee claims the 
employer has fabricated performance appraisals to force a 
resignation if the appraisals themselves appear facially val-
id.255 
C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE ABI 
VIOLATED PuBLIC POLICY BY DISCHARGING TuRNER IN 
RETALIATION FOR HIS COMPLAINTS 
The majority incorrectly found that Turner had not pre-
sented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact con-
cerning whether his supervisors constructively discharged him 
in retaliation for his complaints about illegal activity he ob-
served in 1984.256 However, assuming Turner's discharge was 
in retaliation for his complaints, the question then becomes 
whether such a retaliatory discharge would have violated fun-
damental public policy.257 
1. The Turner court incorrectly decided that ABI did not 
discharge Turner in retaliation for his complaints in 1984 
Turner claimed that his supervisors deliberately fabricated 
his performance appraisals in retaliation for his history of 
complaints about allegedly improper and illegal activities he 
witnessed while employed at ABI.258 The court, however, 
ruled that Turner's allegation of retaliation fails because Turn-
er did not resign until approximately five years after the occur-
rence of the only illegal activities that may have implicated 
public policy.259 The dissent correctly noted that the passage 
of time between Turner's original reporting activities and his 
eventual resignation should not have been sufficient to elimi-
255. See id. at 1034-35 (majority op.) Because Turner's 1988 performance ap-
praisal appeared valid on its face and because it was given nearly three years 
after Turner's complaints about illegal activities, the court found that it reflected a 
bona fide assessment of Turner's performance on the job. 1d. 
256. See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1041-42 (Cal. 1994) 
(Kennard, J., dissenting). 
257. See id. at 1043. 
258. [d. at 1041-42. 
259. [d. at 1034. 
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nate any causal relationship as a matter of law.260 Turner 
produced evidence of a causal sequence beginning with his 
reporting of illegal activities in 1984, leading to his transfer to 
the delivery department in 1985, his continuing reporting 
activities while at the delivery department, and finally culmi-
nating in the final fabricated performance appraisal in late 
1988.261 Thus, although the statutory violations giving rise to 
the public policy element of Turner's constructive discharge 
claim were somewhat removed in time from Turner's eventual 
resignation, a jury could have decided as fact that a causal 
relationship did indeed exist.262 
2. ABI violated public policy by retaliating against Turner 
Even if Turner had created a triable issue of fact as to 
whether his supervisors used fabricated performance apprais-
als to drive him from his job, summary judgment would still 
have been proper if Turner could not show that his discharge 
violated some fundamental public policy.263 An employee has 
a cause of action for tortious wrongful discharge if the employ-
ee is fired for performing an act that public policy would en-
courage, or for refusing to do something that public policy 
would condemn.264 However, difficulties arise in determining 
whether a claim genuinely involves public policy or a lesser 
controversy.265 Accordingly, the policy in question must not 
only affect society at large, but must also be delineated in 
constitutional or statutory provisions.266 Thus, to avoid sum-
mary judgment, Turner was required to show, at a minimum, 
that his discharge violated some public policy set out in a stat-
ute or constitution.267 
As noted by both the majority and the dissent, the only 
260. See id at 1043. 
261. [d. 
262. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1043 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
263. See supra notes 63 - 75 for further discussion of public policy in the con-
structive discharge context. 
264. Gantt v. Sentry Insurance, 824 P.2d 680, 684 (Cal. 1992); Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988). 
265. GanU, 824 P.2d at 687. 
266. [d. at 684, 687. 
267. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1032-33. 
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potential public policy element of Turner's claim arises out of 
his complaints regarding allegedly illegal activities observed at 
ABI in 1984.268 The majority chastised Turner for failing to 
identify violations of specific statutory or constitutional provi-
sions that might have implicated fundamental public poli-
cy.269 The majority maintained that Turner's reference to only 
one provision of the ABC Act270 put both ABI and the court 
"in the position of having to guess at the nature of the public 
policies involved, if any.,,271 Thus, the court found Turner's 
claim "plainly insufficient" to create an issue of fact as to 
whether public policy had been violated.272 
The majority further ruled that even if Turner had had 
statutory support, merely witnessing violations of the ABC Act 
did not implicate public policy.273 The court found Turner's 
claim rested on an allegation of whistle-blower harassment 
since Turner could not show his supervisor's discharged him 
for refusing to participate in any illegal act.274 However, the 
court also found that Turner could not show his employers 
forced his resignation in retaliation for his complaints because 
his resignation in 1988 was too far removed from the allegedly 
illegal acts of 1984.275 
In so holding, the majority did not consider whether ABI 
may have violated public policy by constructively discharging 
Turner in retaliation for his complaints about the alleged ABC 
Act violations.276 The majority opinion did not discuss wheth-
er a retaliatory discharge for complaints to one's own employer 
regarding illegal acts would violate public policy. Although the 
268. [d. at 1033-34 (majority op.), 1042 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
269. [d. at 1033 (majority op.). 
270. See supra notes 13, 14 and 144 for complete discussion of the statutory 
violations alleged by Turner and those considered by the majority. 
271. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033. 
272. [d. 
273. [d. at 1034. 
274. [d. 
275. [d. 
276. See id. Because the Turner majority found Turner's resignation too far re-
moved from any alleged violations of public policy to justify a trial on the merits, 
Turner, 876 P.2d at 1034, the court never reached the issue of whether an orches-
trated campaign to force an employee to resign, such as alleged by Turner, would 
have violated public policy. 
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majority agreed that violations of the ABC Act might implicate 
a fundamental public policy,277 the court rejected Turner's 
public policy claim in the "classic Tameny278 sense" because 
ABI never asked Turner to participate in any illegal activity 
and did not harass him for fulfilling any legal duty or for ex-
erting any statutory prerogative.279 Therefore, the court held 
Turner's only potential claim was that he was discharged in 
retaliation for reporting an alleged statutory violation.280 The 
court's finding that insufficient evidence existed to show a 
nexus between the statutory violations of the 1984 and 
Turner's eventual resignation necessarily precluded any discus-
sion of whether retaliation for Turner's complaints might have 
violated public policy.281 
In a similar situation, the Court of Appeal in Blom v. 
N.G.K Spark Plugs (U.S.A.), Inc.,282 considered whether dis-
charging an employee in retaliation for his attempts to rectify 
his employer's violations of the law violated public policy. 283 
In Blom, N.G.K. Spark Plugs had hired Blom as personnel 
manager and had given him instructions to "Americanize" the 
corporation's disproportionately Japanese staff. 2M However, 
when Blom attempted to comply with FEHA285 and Title 
VII,286 N.G.K. Spark Plugs terminated Blom in retaliation for 
his efforts.287 The court held that the legislative purpose un-
derlying FEHA and Title VII would be undermined if employ-
ers were allowed to terminate employees for "protesting work-
ing conditions which they reasonably believe constitute a haz-
ard to their own health or safety, or the health or safety of oth-
ers. "288 The court ruled that achieving the statutory objective 
277. Id. 
278. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (holding that 
an employer who discharges an employee who refuses to participate in an illegal 
price fixing scheme is liable in tort). 
279. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1033-34. 
280. Id. 
281. See id. 
282. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Ct. App. 1992). 
283. Id. at 143. 
284. Id. at 140. 
285. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 12900 et seq. (West 1989). 
286. 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e et seq. (1989). 
287. Blom, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140. 
288. Id. at 143. 
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of a safe and healthy work environment for all employees re-
quires that employees be free to call their employer's attention 
to illegal practices within the employee's knowledge.289 Mak-
ing the employer aware of illegal activities and giving the 
employer the opportunity to take corrective action, the court 
held, is important to effectuating the statutory intent.29o 
Thus, a common law action in tort arises when an employer 
discharges an employee in retaliation for resisting employer 
violations of the law that secure fundamental public poli-
cies.291 
Likewise, Turner's discharge in retaliation for his com-
plaints to his supervisors about the illegal activity he observed 
in 1984 also violated public policy.292 In enacting the ABC 
Act, the California Legislature declared that the subject matter 
of the Act "involves in the highest degree the economic, social, 
and moral well-being and the safety of the State and of all its 
people. »293 Therefore, the termination of an employee for at-
tempting to effect the purposes of the ABC Act must also im-
plicate a fundamental public policy.294 Thus, because Turner 
presented sufficient evidence that ABI discharged him in retal-
iation for his complaints about illegal conduct he observed in 
1984, Turner's discharge must also have violated public policy. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., the California Supreme 
Court held that Turner, an executive employee, could not 
maintain his claim for constructive wrongful discharge as a 
matter of law.295 The Turner court's finding that the mere 
passage of time had dispelled any causal relationship between 
Turner's reporting activities in 1984 and his resignation in 
1989 bodes ill for employees working for legally savvy employ-
ers. As Justice Kennard noted in her dissent, a legally sophisti-
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. See id. at 1042-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
293. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23001(West 1985), see supra note 145 for the 
legislature's declaration of purpose included in the ABC Act. 
294. See Turner, 876 P.2d at 1042-43 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
295. Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 876 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Cal. 1994). 
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cated employer might elect to allow some interval of time to 
pass before taking illicit action against an employee it regards 
as disloya1.296 Thus, in a claim for whistle-blower harassment 
similar to Turner's, an employer might choose to allow some 
time to pass before engaging in any activity designed to con-
structively discharge the employee. While a court might recog-
nize that the employer would have violated fundamental public 
policy had the discharge taken place earlier, the court would 
feel constrained by Turner to grant a motion for summary 
judgment if there were any question whether the employee can 
prove a nexus between the reporting activity and the dis-
charge. 
This note has argued that the California Supreme Court's 
reinstatement of the trial court's summary judgment order was 
flawed since it failed to recognize three material issues of fact 
presented by Turner.297 First, Turner produced evidence that 
his supervisors engaged in a campaign to use fabricated perfor-
mance appraisals to force Turner to resign or to "set him up" 
for eventual discharge. Second, since the court found Turner's 
employer did not try to force Turner's resignation, the court 
failed to reach the issue of whether such action would consti-
tute intolerable circumstances. Finally, the court held that 
Turner's claim failed to state a public policy claim since it 
incorrectly found his resignation was too remote in time for 
him to show any connection between his whistle-blowing activi-
ty and his eventual discharge. As a result of the Turner deci-
sion, an unscrupulous employer may use fabricated perfor-
mance appraisals to force the resignation of an employee with 
near impunity. After Turner, an employer need only allow a 
significant amount of time to pass between an incident impli-
cating public policy and the termination of an employee to 
avoid incurring liability for a constructive wrongful discharge. 
Joseph A. Meckes· 
296. Turner, 876 P.2d at 1043 (Kennard, J., dissenting). 
297. See supra notes 202 - 295 and accompanying text. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997. Thanks to Wendy 
Wilbanks for her tireless and admirable dedication. 
42
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/7
